Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and
the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed
came to be the armed forces
The British did not want to annoy Nehru who wanted "a certain
variation of the boundary line." It was argued that the
boundaries were determined as a result of "the judgement
of an eminent lawyer," who had "no conceivable axe to
grind" in Indian politics. But the honourable member of the British
Bar "departed from the tradition of British justice, perhaps,
because the matter was not judicial but political."
As for the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Mountbatten's initial
Partition plan had given these to the proposed free state of Bengal.
But since June 3 Plan had given East Bengal to Pakistan, Jinnah
laid a claim to these islands. He argued that the islands were
never a part of India and the population consisted of tribes
who were not connected with the people of Indian by ethnic, cultural
or religious ties.
He pointed out that the only channel of communication
between East and West Pakistan was by sea and these islands occupied
a strategic position on that route and provided refueling bases.
Jinnah also desired to discuss the future of these islands before
August 15, from a defence point of view. The viceroy was, however,
advised against negotiations with the Indian leaders on defence
matters before that date. Naturally, this strategy led to the
handing over the islands to India.
The problem of the princely states was even more complicated.
The Mountbatten Plan had envisaged that the withdrawal of the
British could mean giving a free choice to the states to remain
independent or join with either of the successor dominions. Mountbatten,
however, saw to it that none of the states would exercise its
choice for Independence. It was his policy that they must join
one of the two dominions according to their geographical position,
conceding at least defence, foreign affairs and communication
to the central authority.
The secretary of state for India also
advised him that "it was out of question for Britain to do
anything to encourage states to stand out completely."
The Congress leaders has also asked Mountbatten not to do anything
to encourage the states to declare their independence. It appears
that the United States had exercised its influence on Britain
not to grant independence to the states. Though the British
wanted the states to accede to one of the dominions, it appears
that, in case of a tie, the government's preference was for India.
The reason, in the words of Mountbatten, was that the Indian Union
"consisting nearly three-fourth of India and with its immense
resources and its important strategic position in the Indian Ocean"
could not be estranged. Naturally, he was found to be "working
hard" on the representatives of certain major states to accede
to India.
From the viewpoint of Pakistan, the accession of the states of
Hyderabad and Kashmir are more significant. The Hyderabad state
was about the size of England and Scotland put together, with
a population of 17 million and a regular army. It was a land-locked
state and was in need of a seaport. On July 1, 1947, Hyderabad
issued a farman that after the departure of the British, the state
would be independent.
Mountbatten and W T Monkton, the British
adviser to the government of Hyderabad, tried their best "in
a coordinated plan of campaign," to bring the Nizam to accede
to India. Jinnah warned Mountbatten that in case the Congress attempted
to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, the hundred million Muslims
would "rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty
in India."
Mountbatten, however, hoped that the "Nizam need
not fear any armed intervention" and the Congress would be able
to disrupt the dynasty from within. The facts proved otherwise.
The Congress was unable to wreck the dynasty from within and Hyderabad
had to suffer the onslaught of an Indian military intervention
immediately after Jinnah's death in September 1948.
The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a typical example where all
other dictates were sacrificed at the altar of strategic interests
of India. From the geographical, historical, demographic, economic
and geopolitical points of view, Kashmir should have acceded to
Pakistan. But Mountbatten had been emphasising upon certain states,
including Kashmir to join the Indian Union because of their geographical
location.
As early as June 1947, Nehru had formally asked Mountbatten
that though Muslims formed 77.11% of the population in the Jammu
and Kashmir state, it should go to India. The foremost reason
for his demand was that the state was "of the first importance
to India as a whole... because of the great strategic importance
of that frontier state." Jinnah publicly indicated that
wisdom demanded that the ruler of Kashmir would not ignore, much
less hurt, "feelings and sentiments of the Muslims"
who formed 80% of the population.
But, in the end, the Mountbatten-Nehru
collusion succeeded in bringing the ruler of Kashmir into declaring
accession to India. Thus the fate of four million people, more
than three quarters Muslim, was settled not by the popular wish
but by the whims of one man, with the active encouragement and
support of the last viceroy of the British Crown.
Though Pakistan suffered in the division of the provinces and
the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed
came to be the armed forces. Although the population of Pakistan
was about 25% of the Indian subcontinent, its share of the amed
forces was about 33%. But the Pakistan army had an initial setback
that its forces were neither organised nor all of them available
in Pakistan. In fact, Lieutenant General Frank W Messervy, British GOC-in-C
of the Northern Command, replied to the viceroy, that out of 67
battalions available in West Pakistan, only 35 would be left there.
Even these were to be at half strength owing to the movement of
Hindu and Sikh companies. No Muslim companies were available in
Pakistan for any replacement. This was precisely one of the
reasons that the Pakistan army could not be used in Kashmir in October
1947 against the Indian military intervention. Later, when the
Pakistan army was a little better organised it prevented the Indian
forces from occupying the entire state of Kashmir and forced India
to seek a cease-fire.
But since the basic tensions remained
unresolved, it was natural for the two armed forces to clash,
as they did in the 1965 and 1971. And even thereafter the historical,
geo-political and strategic compulsions cannot be overlooked as
they would continue to determine the course of history in times
to come.
Excerpted from Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective, by Dr Noor-ul Haq, Reliance Publishing House, 1997, Rs 395, with the publisher's permission. Readers who wish to buy a copy of this book may write to Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi 11 00 08.
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