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The Rediff Special/ Kanti Bajpai

Nuclear deal on the cards

The course of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks, after three rounds, suggest a nuclear deal between India and the US is on the cards. The fourth round of talks between the two countries are coming up. What is the likelihood that New Delhi and Washington can resolve their major differences? The prospects are quite good, but domestic politics in both countries and the influence of third parties will affect the course of negotiations.

A number of issues have been discussed by the two delegations, but clearly two matters are crucial: Weaponisation and signing the CTBT on weaponisation. India repeated that its decision to deploy nuclear weapons is non-negotiable. The US position continued to be that India and Pakistan must stop short of deployment. Second, India proposed that it would join a test ban in return for the lifting or easing of sanctions and the relaxation of controls on dual-use technologies including nuclear reactors. By contrast, Washington insisted that India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty unconditionally.

Clearly, the most serious disagreements between the two sides are the first two items: weaponisation and the CTBT. Even here, convergence is not impossible. India has already suggested that for now it will keep its nuclear warheads separate from delivery vehicles. If so, Washington could accept the de-mating of nuclear weapons as a posture which does not amount to "deployment". After all, before May 11, both India had precisely such a system in place. The difference now is that both countries would be far more explicit about numbers of weapons, procedures, and lines of civilian and nuclear authority. It may therefore be possible to reconcile the Indian and US positions on deployment.

On the CTBT, also, there is the possibility of an agreement. New Delhi has indicated that its opposition to the CTBT stands more or less nullified by the tests of May 11 and 13. That is, in principle, it is no longer against the Treaty. At the third round of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks, the Indian position was clear enough: if the price was right, it would be prepared to sign the Treaty. The prime minister has reaffirmed India's willingness to join a test ban.

While the US has publicly rejected the idea of a deal, the fact that it agreed to the high-level talks with India suggest that in reality it was reconciled to some sort of bargain before it embarked on the talks. The high level of the talks and the speed at which the first four meetings were held indicate that Washington understood that something beyond the normal course of diplomacy was required. What is at issue, then, is not over signing the CTBT or cutting a deal, but rather what is a mutually acceptable price.

Four important development occurred in and around the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks which have helped the negotiations along. First, the Indian foreign secretary stated publicly that New Delhi understood the difficulties in according India recognition as a nuclear weapon state. The second signal that New Delhi sent out was that it could live with US sanctions. It no longer expected the Clinton administration to altogether withdraw the sanctions, given the stringency of US laws and the pressures in Congress. By saying that it could live with the sanctions, New Delhi also suggested that in return for signing the CTBT it was not enough for the US to withdraw the sanctions.

For its part, the US also made two gestures. The first gesture was to move a Congressional amendment which would allow the president to waive sanctions, if US national interest demanded this, for up to a year. The second gesture was a US statement that whereas Washington opposed deployment of the Agni missile, it understood the need for further testing of the delivery vehicle which India claims is vital for its deterrent against China.

A number of factors, domestic and international, will play a role in the final outcome of the India-US talks.

First of all, in India, the most important factor is whether the anti-CTBT sentiment can be reversed. The Left and Left-of-centre parties in India still see New Delhi's rejection of the Treaty as part of an anti-imperialist fight against US power. The Congress is in a dilemma. If it supports a deal with the US, it can be accused of a sellout by the very parties whose backing it needs to get back into power. Worse, if the BJP government succeeds in getting a deal, India's new-found nuclear status will be credited to its policies and political courage and not to the Congress.

If, on the other hand, the Congress does not support the deal, the BJP will be able to accuse it of having lost the country a profitable deal. The way out for the Congress and the BJP is to persuade the Left and Left-of-centre parties to come round on the CTBT, but this will be no mean feat given the depth of feeling on the CTBT and the animosity of those parties for the BJP.

A second domestic factor is the longevity of the BJP-led coalition. No government except the Rao government has lasted its five-year term since 1989. Should the BJP government fall, there could be a change of track. At the very least, domestic uncertainties would cast a shadow over the talks with the US. Washington would have to be sure that it was dealing with a government that could see the process of negotiation through and implement any agreements.

On the US side, the key hurdle to an agreement could be various forces in the US Congress. These include those who are hostile to India and feel a sense of loyalty to Pakistan. Then, there are the traditional anti-proliferationists who want everyone to sign the NPT and CTBT, no ifs and buts. There are also inveterate critics of the Clinton administration and its liberal, internationalist diplomacy. A key figure here is Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition, there are those in the state department who had supported the opening to India and who feel a sense of betrayal over the tests.

Domestic politics in India and US are the most important factors in determining the future of nuclear diplomacy. However, there are at least two international factors that will also have an effect. The first is Pakistan. Any "concessions" to India will surely elicit strong protests from Pakistan, a long-time ally of the US and a country, which many Americans still regard as being vital for US security. The likelihood that Pakistan will protest and that it will want to cut its own rather substantial deal may strain the US's ability to make concessions in the first place.

The other international factor which will have an impact on India-US nuclear diplomacy is China. If the US is seriously trying to involve China in South Asia, an India-US agreement will be jeopardised. No redder strategic rag can be imagined for any Indian government than a US-China partnership. China, for its part, may use its relationship with the US to try and limit a deal with India. Beijing, clearly, has an interest in limiting Indian nuclear and conventional military capabilities. It should be remembered that the US-China relationship is of much greater moment to Washington than the US-India relationship.

First, the US stake in China's economy is far greater than in India's. China has been on the path of economic reforms since the late 1970s. India only began its reforms process in 1991. The US looks at China as an economic partner in other ways. For instance, Beijing helped the sinking economies of East and Southeast Asia during the crisis of 1998.

Second, China, however mixed its record, is partnering the US in global non-proliferation. It has joined the NPT as a nuclear weapon state and signed the CTBT. It has also promised to abide by many of the obligations of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Most recently, it has undertaken not to export nuclear and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan.

China has been a key player in the nuclear deal with North Korea. India, by contrast, is not part of the non-proliferation regime, rather it is its object. Nor is it relevant to the situation in the Korean peninsula.

The great nuclear game in the Subcontinent is delicately poised. India and the US seem to be headed towards a resolution of their differences. However, there are pitfalls along the way. How it ends will depend on the sagacity of leaders in both countries and their ability to deal with domestic constituencies and third countries.

Kanti Bajpai, associate professor of international relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, is an expert on Indo-US issues.

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