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The Rediff Special

Operation Leech: What really happened?

The army is trying to scuttle a CBI investigation into Operation Leech in the Andamans. What are they trying to hide?

It was quiet. It was brutal. It was hell in the archipelago in what will go down as the most astounding encounter staged by India's war machine. As a counter-insurgency operation, its build-up, manoeuvres and subtle subterfuge had all the qualities of a small-scale military offensive. Yet, in the end, not many of those who took part in this exercise -- code-named Operation Leech -- would perhaps like to cherish its memory, tainted as it may be by the blood of friends and the guilt that goes with betrayal.

On February 12, Major General S C Chopra, additional director-general, military operations, ministry of defence, told the press in New Delhi that Indian security forces had intercepted, on February 11, a major gang of international gunrunners supplying weapons to different secessionist groups in the North-East. The story unfurled further in follow ups that claimed a joint operation mounted by the army, navy, air force and the Coast Guard had successfully aborted a clandestine shipment of lethal weapons valued at around US $ 1 million.

In the skirmish that ensued, six gunrunners were said to have been killled in an encounter -- their bodies lost to the heaving sea -- 73 others arrested, four vessels impounded and a huge cache of arms and ammunitions recovered. The operation was apparently mounted following the receipt of impeccable military intelligence about the movement of the smugglers. It was touted as the biggest seizure of sophisticated weapons being landed on Indian territory since the Purulia arms drop in December 1995. For India's security personnel, it was yet another feather in their already-crowded cap.

But is this the real story?

When we reached Port Blair on March 7, the authorities, including the army, navy, and the Coast Guard, were surprisingly tight-lipped about an incident that should normally have been trumpeted as a major success story. Officialdom was extremely secretive, withholding information on the plea of safeguarding 'national security' interests.'

The Andaman & Nicobar headquarters teemed with sleuths of every hue. Among the agencies that had flown in their top-notch officers were the CBI, the Intelligence Bureau, RAW, the Subsidiary Intelligence Branch, the Military Intelligence Unit and SIT, each trying to prise out information. And our sources within some of these agencies were hinting at a cover-up and raising unsavoury questions.

Were the arrested men, and those who were killed, professional gunrunners carrying arms for the North-East, or were they members of the Arakan Army, the military wing of the National United Party of Arakan, which is fighting the repressive Myanmarese junta for a separate Arakan state? And could they have been lured into a trap and stabbed in the back by the Indian authorities, who, after propping them up for the past few years, now suddenly decided to sack them to placate Myanmar's dictators?

Preparations for the assault had begun several days in advance. From February 3 onwards, the quietude of Landfall, an uninhabited island 250 km off Port Blair in the pristine Andaman & Nicobar archipelago, was shattered by an unprecedented flurry of activities.

Three vessels -- CGS Vivek, CGS Ganga Devi, CGS Lakshmibai -- belonging to the Coast Guard, and two -- LCU-33 and LCU-35 -- belonging to the navy, had sailed from Port Blair.

Two other naval ships -- INS Sarayu, INS Vindhyagiri -- brought in crack marine commandos and hardware from Visakhapatnam, headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command. And all seven ships, with 180 sailors and officers, took up position in a line between Landfall and Narcondum Islands.

Five helicopters belonging to the air force (two MI-8s), navy (two MI-8s) and the Coast Guard (one Chetak) did sorties from Madras, Car Nicobar and the Brichgunj cantonment near Port Blair, ferrying in men and material.

Aircraft based at naval base INS Utkrosh in Port Blair flew several sorties to Landfall and East Islands with a few army officers. Among them was Lt-Col A J Grewal, a military intelligence officer. There is, however, some confusion regarding his initials. Some say his name is P S Grewal, others seem to know him as Vijay Grewal. He is believed to have been born in Myanmar and was in touch with Myanmarese military intelligence.

Lt-Col Grewal, say Intelligence sources, was the key man in this operation. They say he speaks Burmese fluently, and had apparently visited Myanmar and Thailand in January. That he did go to Bangkok has also been confirmed by sources in the NUPA from Arakan.

By the time the sun went down on February 9, everything was in place. The net had been perfectly laid to trap an approaching flotilla of four vessels -- two speedboats and two fishing trawlers -- that had already reached the vicinity of Narcondam Island, about 140 nautical miles from Landfall. And as night fell, the Indian armada waited.

One version of what happened in the next 36 hours can be had from the FIR filed on February 18 -- seven days after the incident -- by R S Dhankar, lieutenant commander, deputy naval provost marshal, for fortress commander, Commodore A S Rai, A & N, with the station house officer, central crime section of the A & N police.

It says: 'Hard intelligence was received that a consignment of arms, ammunition and equipment was being brought by some foreign nationals to Landfall Island in trawlers/speed boats. They were reported to be of South East Asian origin. Intelligence sources intimated that the purpose of bringing the arms, ammunition, stores and equipment to Landfall Island was to subsequently trans-ship them illegally to terrorists/militant outfits in north eastern states of India via Cox Bazar in Bangladesh.

'A joint tri-services operation was launched on 09 Feb 98 to apprehend the foreigners along with their arms, ammunition and equipments. Coast Guard ships and Police were also used in the operation. The operation progressed successfully and resulted in the capture of 73 foreign nationals… Six foreign nationals tried to escape into the adjoining area while opening fire with their weapons on our troops. Our troops immediately responded in self defence and fatally injured six of them whilst in the water. They were seen disappearing in the sea and are presumed dead. After a search none of the six bodies could be recovered.'

Dhankar also stated that the 73 arrested men were to be handed over (to the civil authorities) at Camp Bell Bay, but requested that the 'arms, ammunition and equipment' be allowed to be retained by the army/navy for further investigation. 'The same,' he declared, 'will be produced as and when desired by the court.'

Within days of the FIR, the government ordered a CBI probe.

It was an open and shut case as far as the defence establishment was concerned. Some foreign nationals, abetting terrorism in the North-East, had been killed in an encounter, their accomplices arrested, and arms seized. The services had jointly acted on the basis of tip-offs given by military sources and had succeeded. And there, on that victorious note, the matter should have rested. Such encounters, in the interest of national security, are not unusual in Kashmir and even in the North-East. The CBI is rarely, if at all, asked to meddle in such cases.

But here, the GOI's decision to put the CBI on the trail seemed to suggest there was more to it than met the eye.

CBI sources say that the Union home ministry asked them to investigate after the army's hush-hush attitude had fuelled speculation in the local press and had sent the A & N administration into a tizzy.

On February 12, newspapers in Port Blair carried reports of a joint anti-smuggling operation by the navy and the army the day before, but the A & N administration had been kept in the dark. And even though days passed, the civil administration wasn't informed, nor was any FIR filed. Besides, the arrested men had neither been handed over to the police nor produced in court even three days after their arrest, when, by law, it is mandatory to do so within 24 hours.

Sources in Port Blair said in order to cover its back, the A & N administration pressured the fortress commander to file a case. A & N Inspector-General of Police Y R Dhuriya took a personal initiative to make the defence establishment conform to law.

The services complied on February 18 by formally filing an FIR and handing over the detained foreigners. But the arms, ammunition and other hardware seized in the operation -- which form vital part of the body of evidence -- were withheld. Only a list of the materials was provided.

Since then, it has been a period of unbroken silence. More than four months after taking up the case, the CBI is nowhere near filing a charge-sheet against the detainees. In fact, they are likely to set free by the court because of the CBI's failure to frame charges within 90 days of their arrest.

CBI sources in New Delhi said that the defence authorities have completely stonewalled the investigation by refusing to co-operate.

Kind courtesy: Sunday magazine

Operation Leech, continued

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