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The Rediff Special/ Ashok Banker

Advertising Terrorism

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The militant groups currently wreaking havoc in Kashmir are more interested in brand building than religious fundamentalism, writes Ashok Banker.

The most stunning advertising campaign of the year reached its climax at 5.45 pm on November 3, 1999.

Three marketing executives entered the cantonment area of the Indian army's 15 Corps Battalion Headquarters in Srinagar, blasted away with AK-47s and grenades and killed 17 Indian army and security force officers and jawans, wounding several others. Their prime target, Major Pramod Purshottam, PRO of the Indian army in Jammu and Kashmir, died on the spot.

With the area's high security -- the 15 Corps cantonment is one of the biggest field deployments of the Indian army anywhere in the country -- the intrusion was literally a 'mission impossible.' Yet, not only did the three executives succeed brilliantly, they themselves suffered only two casualties while the third one managed to escape unharmed. The agency behind the hit-and-run operation later identified itself to the media as a group named Lashkar-e-Toyba.

Don't look bewildered. Yes, I am talking about the recent terrorist attack on Army HQ at Srinagar, which was front page news in every newspaper and headline news on every television news channel for the next two days. So what does that have to do with brand building? And why am I calling the militants 'marketing executives' and the group an 'ad agency'?

What else do you think they are? Do you really think that the Lashkar-e-Toyba militants took on a suicidal mission like that because it was an important military target? They would have been better off attacking the actual 15 Corps HQ just a km away.

Instead, they picked the PRO's office of all places. Why? And why did they attack in broad daylight when they could have struck under cover of night? Why did they assassinate Major Purshottam, a press liaison officer, when there are generals by the dozen to be had in J&K? How was it that their press releases were ready the moment the operation was over?

The reason for these and in fact, for most of the current campaign of violence being waged in Kashmir valley, is part of a long-term PR campaign designed at brand building. Every tactic those extremists used, every single thing they did, was motivated not by religious fundamentalism or even by the desire to 'free' Kashmir from India, but to achieve a goal as clearly defined as any consumer brand's marketing strategy.

The Lashkar-e-Toyba is a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist group that operates under the auspices of a legitimate political faction. They are not a bunch of angry kids running about with guns. They are highly trained commandos -- mostly Afghani, Pakistani, and even a couple from Saudi Arabia -- who are well-funded, well-organised and often better equipped than an average Indian army unit.

These are people who can use an AK-47 -- or more likely, the Type 56 Chinese copy which is often mistakenly called an AK-56 -- draft out a lucid press release, design a propaganda poster using an iMac or a PC, draft out an ad to run in the Islampasand press in Pakistan and India to tomtom their achievements, and even script, stage, shoot and edit videos to promote their activities and group profile.

I am not just talking from second-hand press reports. I have met a member of their group (who, of course, had a legitimate alias) and believe me, he was as sophisticated in his language, presentation and conceptualisation as any Nariman Point ad exec. Like several other members of the group, he had received his training (or should we call it 'brainwashing' in a UK-based 'camp').

He freely admitted that his 'cause' had sympathisers in the UK and USA, and that these nameless benefactors often sponsored relatively less privileged youth who were willing to fight instead of their sponsors. Sort of like knight errants of yore, sent out by queens to fight on their behalf.

What he did not admit openly, but which I found from later research, was that the Lashkar-e-Toyba, like most modern terrorist groups, no longer have a true ideological agenda. Some of the group's members are as concerned about establishing their group's identity than with Islamic jehad.

They celebrate when they are named on CNN and BBC and Star News. And how they achieve their brand promotion does not matter much. Just like some legit advertising agency folk who are willing to use near-pornographic visuals, mock religious icons and make exaggerated claims to attract attention to the brand, these people are willing to commit murder and mayhem to achieve their goals.

Over the last few years, they have killed as many Muslims in Kashmir as Hindus and security forces, snuffing out any notion you may have had that they are Islampasand religious fanatics. A former member of the group -- who lives in fear of being tracked down and killed for having gone AWOL -- revealed to me that some of the faction are often more concerned about getting named on a news channel five times a day than praying five times.

Even if this dissident was exaggerating out of disillusionment and bitterness, it does not change the fact that the group is very smart and quick on the ball when it comes to PR, and that their recent attacks have often been more tactical than strategic.

The attack on the MI liaison office, for instance, was carefully timed to coincide with a major convention of similar groups in Pakistan, and by accomplishing the daring daylight raid and assassination of Major Purshottam, the Lashkar-e-Toyba stole the limelight from their rival factions at the meet. Word has it, they were celebrating for a week after the event.

In fact, this latest attack is a perfect example of their 'advertising' technique. Major Purshottam was the army’s main liaison with the press during the recent Kargil conflict. Every reporter in the country (and abroad) who covered Kargil knew Purshottam personally. He was a friendly, co-operative man well liked by the press. By killing him, the militants knew they would hit the headlines. And they did. It is what every ad exec dreams of: Leveraging the mass media, seeing the brand name in editorial columns, the ad campaign in the headlines.

This was the goal of the Lashkar-e-Toyba. In their war of media attrition, good publicity is more important than strategic attacks. The army calls this tactical warfare. I call it advertising terrorism.

The Lashkar-e-Toyba's long-term strategy is not just to win Azadi for Kashmir, but to establish its own brand identity. Long after the Kashmir conflict is over, they will still be active and available for hire to the highest bidder: Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Congo, you name it, they will go there and get the job done. And you can always count on them to make headlines and take up airtime.

Because, like any good advertising and PR firm, that is what they do best.

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