The Rediff Special / J N Dixit

The armed forces have assumed the responsibility of managing Pakistan's political crises and ensuring the country's stability

Pakistan's military establishment had sought such a role since Zia-ul Haq's times. But it was inhibited about pushing through a decision in this regard due to the emotive fervour for democracy amongst the people of Pakistan at the end of Zia's long military rule and also due to two other reasons.

First, American friends of the military establishment advised them to encourage this facade of democracy while retaining real power. Secondly, the Pakistani military leadership itself, having experienced the controversies and burdens of direct political governance, did not wish to be enmeshed in them again. General Aslam Beg, however, asserted as early as in 1990 that the Pakistani armed forces had a supra-governmental role of defending not just the territorial integrity, but the stability and the ideology of Pakistan beyond the procedural and institutional stipulations of the existing Pakistani constitution.

Beg's successors, Janjua and Kakkar, wanted the creation of such a council. Kakkar almost succeeded; with Benazir's increasing dependence on the Pakistani army, to manage the disturbances in Sindh and in operations in Punjab and Baluchistan. It was Benazir who suggested the creation of such a council late in 1995 and early in 1996 to defuse the impression of her not getting along with the Pakistan armed forces and establishment gaining ground.

The profound instability and uncertainties affecting Pakistan due to Benazir's mismanagement of affairs obviously persuaded amry chief Jehangir Karamat to indicate to Leghari that if he desired to stabilise the situation in Pakistan and remain in control, the army had to be given a legitimised institutional role in governance.

It would not be an inaccurate speculation that Leghari must have consulted senior members of Pakistan's supreme court, the US government and senior civil servants apart from acting prime minister Miraj Khalid and General Karmat before creating this council. It is interesting that despite the passage of a fortnight since Leghari's decision to create the council, no political party or leader in Pakistan has challenged the constitutional validity of the armed forces being given such a role, in the Supreme Court.

There has been criticism of the decision by the major political parties -- Benazir's faction of the PPP and Nawaz Sharief's Muslim League -- but their criticism has been muted. Significantly, none of the political parties have criticised the armed forces. The criticism has been directed only at Leghari, accusing him of political motivation and hunger for power.

Implications of the creation of the CDNS for Pakistan would be substantive and long term. First, the council, dominated by the armed forces, will function as a super-cabinet, operating in tandem with the president exercising greater authority than the elected government.

Secondly, the armed forces now stand institutionally entrenched in the Pakistani power structure from which it would be difficult to remove it.

Third, the importance of electoral politics and the party system will diminish even if Pakistan remains a democracy with a parliamentary form of government in cosmetic terms.

Fourth, the influence of the armed forces on foreign policy, defence policy and the economic management of Pakistan stands revived and it will increase without being subject to democratic monitoring.

And finally, the Pakistani army establishment would have acquired a role which Zia-ul Haq conceived and Aslam Beg articulated, that of being the supreme symbol and implementor of the ideology of Pakistan, and protector of its identity. These are the likely long-term ramifications.

In the short term, the armed forces have assumed the responsibility of managing the political crises in Pakistan and ensuring the country's stability.

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