'They are not playing politics with the army any more'

General Ved Prakash Malik, the new army chief, assesses the service and its future.

But for Lieutenant General Kevin D'Souza, former deputy chief of army staff being found to be medically unfit, General Ved Prakash Malik would not have made it, first to army commander and now the 19th chief of army staff. He will serve for 26 months, ten months short of the three year term because he will reach the age of superannuating at 60.

"I first got an inkling I would make it as chief when I became GOC-in-C Southern Command," said General Malik during a wide-ranging conversation covering his priorities, concerns and worries. Unlike his predecessor, General Shankar Roy Choudhury, who was catapulted to office by fate, General Malik was groomed for the job. He was lucky being General Chowdhury's vice-chief for 13 months when he was in direct charge of army operations, intelligence and future plans. He could therefore, steer the army according to his own compass.

Both General Malik and General Chowdhury are from Mhow's Higher Command class of 1978, an unprecedented distinction for HC 7. Also unprecedented is the army chief's only son joining the army when there is a famine of young India opting for it. Not only did Sachin Malik join his father's battalion -- the 10 Sikh Light Infantry, the regiment fathered by the late and first officer Victoria Cross winner of the Indian army, Lieutenant General Prem Bhagat -- he also volunteered for a stint in Siachen.

Last week, Sachin called his father to tell him, "Dad I've proposed to someone. I hope you approve." Army tradition requires an officer to get his commanding officer's permission before popping the question. Instead, Sachin informed his father, who is also the colonel of the regiment.

General Ved Malik has sidestepped to an adjoining office and occupied the historic Whitegates on Delhi's Rajaji Marg, returning an infantry chief after 14 years. The last thoroughbred son of the soil was General K V Krishna Rao. Restoring the primacy of the infantry in higher command is a landmark correction which recognises the key role it is playing in quelling domestic disorder, fighting proxy-war and low intensity conflict (LIC).

"Please do not project me as just an infantry officer. I am chief for all arms and services," he emphasised while explaining the imperatives of a correct balance between operational and logistical capabilities. General Malik was reminded of how General K Sundarji burst on the scene as army chief with his famous "Dear Brother Officer" letter addressed to all officers and his labour of love -- Army Plan 2000 --- following a retreat in Goa.

By contrast, General Malik slid into his office quality. He did not need to do a Sundarji. "Being vice-chief of the army staff, I was already in the driving seat. And I got all the co-operation from my predecessor. Yes, I did go to Wellington for a few days to collect my thoughts."

As VOCAS, he closely monitored the operational situation in J & K and the North-East and made frequent visits there. His last survey of these troubled areas was just a few days before assuming the army's ultimate appointment. The tenor of his term was set by the Kargil shelling incident on his first day in office.

On the next day --- Gandhi Jayanti -- he visited the sick and the wounded in the Army Hospital in Delhi Cantonment. Later in the day, in his first exchange with the media after becoming COAS, he spoke on issues such as rationalising the role of the army, concern for mounting casualties in LIC and more than political bureaucratic interference in the army's internal affairs.

Here are General Malik's thoughts :

On threats, resources and capabilities

Preparedness of conventional war must be given the highest priority. "The higher the twin capability of dissuasion and deference, the lower the risk and level of LIC and vice-versa. The erosion in conventional operational capability has emboldened our adversary to raise the threshold of LIC."

What General Malik was suggesting is that war-waging capability has been degraded by consistent reduction in budgetary allotment which has been run down from a high 3.6 per cent of the GDP in 1986 to an all-time low of the present 2.3 per cent of the GDP. The government has imposed a 5 per cent blanket cut on the expenditure of all ministries except defence this year. The trade-off is there will be no customary supplementary demand at the end of the year, contrary to what the defence minister has assured.

General Malik outlined the spectrum of future threats, escalating from LIC to conventional war which is High Intensity Conflict -- HIC -- to nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. The military should be associated with and responsible for strategic forces including missiles, the general said. On force developments he says, "threats alone should not drive capabilities, these have to be met from within allotted funds. Modernisation can no longer be configured merely on creating capabilities but has to be resource-related."

"A proper balance must exist between resources and capabilities. Similarly, no single arm can dictate operational capability or influence the operational environment, be it mobility, firepower, surveillance or intelligence, these assets require to be judiciously distributed on the battlefield. Only then can battles be fought as one of the combined arms."

On low intensity conflict

General Malik sees the LIC environment as having risen from mere dislocation of law and order to insurgency and to LIC. When the external dimension in LIC gets established beyond doubt it becomes proxy war as in J & K. As for the military's involvement in LIC: "Ideally, the army should have no role to play. The central police organisations and paramilitary forces have acquired roughly the same capability as the army and equipment-wise, are better endowed in some cases. They should gradually take the place of the army as is happening now. The army should come in only to combat high intensity militancy."

What this creature is requires elaboration. According to General Malik some "corrections" are already visible in Assam and J & K where "they are not playing politics with the army any more." Asked about the elusive political solution to insurgency, he says "you cannot arrive at a political solution without going to the route of counter-insurgency operations."

Willy, nilly, the army's primary and secondary roles have got inter-changed. Aid to state authority including LIC has overtaken conventional war fighting. The former is infantry-predominant. This required redressal in the present imbalance in modernisation and equipment of the infantry. The new army chief has a rich and varied expertise in handling insurgency in Nagaland, Punjab and J & K. A long overdue bias is now visible in priority of modernisation in the army Ninth Plan.

Many senior officers do not share General Malik's philosophy, especially when the army is taking heavy casualities during peacetime. They feel the army should not be used against its own people and do not like the involvement in policing which inevitably leads to its politicisation. Yet, given the ground reality, the army cannot escape it.

Kind courtesy: Sunday magazine

Continued